Skylift Failed, Cables Blocked Rescue: Probe Into Delhi Fire That Killed 9

Delhi Fire: A devastating fire in a residential-cum-commercial building near Palam Metro Station in southwest Delhi on March 18 killed nine members of a family across three generations, including three children. A magisterial inquiry into the incident has now identified multiple lapses by agencies, including the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), Delhi Fire Services (DFS) and the Electrical Inspectorate, painting a picture of systemic gaps in enforcement, equipment readiness and technical capability.

The inquiry, conducted by the South-West District Magistrate, said a Bronto Skylift positioned outside the building failed to rise, most likely due to a technical glitch compounded by entanglement with low-hanging telecom, internet and cable TV wires. Firefighters had to manually shift cables and remove banners before the vehicle could be positioned, delaying rescue. By the time a second Skylift arrived, all nine people trapped on the third-floor balcony had died.

What the inquiry found

The report reconstructs the timeline of the fire and rescue operation in detail. It says the fire likely began at around 6 am near an MCB (miniature circuit breaker) box inside the four-storey building. At approximately 6.15 am, an eyewitness noticed the flames while the family was asleep. One person, Sachin, escaped through the roof of an adjoining building with burn injuries and was evacuated. This story was also covered by NDTV.

Police and fire tenders reached the spot at 7.11 am. The initial DFS deployment included four water tenders, one quick-response vehicle, one motor pump, one Bronto Skylift and one water bowser. The response was upgraded from Make-4 to Make-6 at 7.20 am as the fire intensified.

At around 7.40 am, the Bronto Skylift, identified as BS-III, reached the narrow lane and took position outside the building. Residents were seen waiting on the third-floor balcony. A child identified in the inquiry brief as Baby Mitali fell from the building during the rescue operation and was evacuated with injuries. The Skylift’s boom, however, failed to rise.

A second Bronto Skylift was requested at 7.55 am. The incident was upgraded to the “medium” category at 8.05 am, additional water bowsers were requested at 8.35 am and a turntable ladder was demanded at 9.14 am. By the time the second Skylift arrived, all nine people trapped inside had died. The fire was reported under control at 10.20 am and declared stopped at 2.20 pm. DFS ultimately deployed 31 firefighting units.

The inquiry credited firefighters with preventing the blaze from spreading to an adjoining handloom shop and the wider market, despite being unable to save the trapped residents.

Why the rescue failed

The Bronto Skylift is a hydraulic aerial platform used by DFS for high-rise rescue and firefighting operations. The report said BS-III failed at the scene amid an apparent technical glitch, most likely compounded by its boom becoming entangled in overhead cables, wires and banners.

Firefighters, assisted by local residents, had to manually shift the low-hanging cables and clear banners before the vehicle could be positioned, directly delaying the rescue. The failure left rescuers without an immediate way to reach the third-floor balcony. The manual ladder at the scene was not tall enough, and no effective alternative tall-reach equipment was immediately available as a second line of defence.

Maintenance records for February and March 2026 showed no previous fault in BS-III. The vehicle had recently operated at Indira Gandhi International Airport, Tilak Nagar and Dwarka, as well as at another, unrelated, Palam fire on March 18, without any reported problem. The crew had more than two years of experience operating the vehicle. But the inquiry found that the authorised dealer, Brijbasi Hi-Tech Udyog Limited, had conducted no formal operator training since 2006. Operators had instead learnt informally from their predecessors.

The inquiry recommended a technical expert committee to establish why the Skylift malfunctioned, mandatory recurring company-certified training and the availability of genuine backup tall-reach equipment at major fire incidents.

Cause of fire: short circuit suspected, proof awaited

The building had six BSES Rajdhani Power Limited electricity connections, two commercial and four residential, and a solar meter installed in July 2023. The BSES supply box outside the building was found intact and undamaged, ruling out a fault on the power-distribution company’s side.

The internal MCB box, however, was completely destroyed. Video footage reportedly showed the fire first appearing near the MCB box, where wiring connected to roughly six electricity connections was densely concentrated. Combustible cosmetics and other commercial stock kept inside the building are believed to have accelerated the spread of the flames.

A joint inspection by the Electrical Inspectorate and BSES, whose report was submitted on March 30, could not establish whether an electrical defect caused the fire or whether the fire caused the short-circuit damage found later. The ground and first-floor electrical installations were too badly burnt for a definitive conclusion.

Building design and ventilation gaps

The compact residential-cum-commercial building had four floors and a basement. It was constructed before 2007 and was covered under the NCT of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2007. The approximately 14.3-metre-high structure stood on a 150-square-metre plot beside a road officially measuring nine metres in width. It had no ventilation shaft or rear setback.

The first and second floors had toughened-glass fronts but no windows or balconies. The third floor had the building’s only balcony, where the residents were seen waiting to be rescued. The inquiry linked the lack of ventilation to the fatal accumulation of smoke, referring to post-mortem findings of smoke inhalation and suffocation.

The basement was partially burnt. The ground, first and second floors were fully burnt, while the third floor was partially damaged, with one room unaffected. The air-conditioning system on the roof was burnt, while a solar installation was also present.

Licence violations and MCD lapses

Three MCD trade licences valid until March 31, 2026, permitted the sale of cosmetics and innerwear only in the basement and on the ground floor. But investigators found commercial activity and storage on the first floor, where remnants of bangles and innerwear were recovered. The office of the Sadh Nagar Market Association was also functioning from the first floor.

The inquiry described this as a deviation from the permitted mixed-land-use conditions and found that compliance monitoring was absent, allowing the commercial use to continue unchecked. The concerned MCD Licensing Inspector and the supervising Assistant Commissioner of the Najafgarh Zone failed to detect and act against the violation, the report said.

The removal of unauthorised banners and other aerial obstructions was also the responsibility of the Licensing Inspector under the Assistant Commissioner’s supervision. The Assistant Commissioner acknowledged the lapse during the inquiry. Disciplinary action was specifically recommended against Licensing Inspector Narender Dabas for failing to check mixed-land-use and licence-condition violations.

Also Read: Delhi Plans ‘Property Aadhaar Card’ For Every Land Parcel Under New Land Records Bill

Illegal wires over a congested lane

Gali No. 2 of Palam is approximately 150 metres long, with narrow, congested streets, widespread encroachments and no proper parking arrangements. Although the road was officially nine metres wide, encroachments restricted the movement and positioning of emergency vehicles.

A web of low-hanging telecom, internet and cable television wires crossed the lane. BSES had authorised only Bharti Airtel to use its low-tension poles there. Other operators identified through site information included Net 24 Into 7 Internet, a local provider associated with Mahesh Chaudhary, Rakesh DEN TV and OM Internet.

The inquiry recommended penal action against operators found culpable. It also proposed mandatory clamps and connectors, limits on cable sagging, minimum clearance from electricity lines and provider-name markings on cables. Road width should determine whether wires can remain overhead or must be moved underground, it said.

Staffing and training gaps in Delhi Fire Services

Of 3,312 sanctioned firefighting posts in Delhi Fire Services, 853, nearly 25 per cent, were vacant. The inquiry recommended filling the vacancies on priority, providing certified recurring training and ensuring backup tall-reach equipment at major incidents. It also referred to multiple Comptroller and Auditor General observations concerning Fire Department equipment and procurement.

Pending CAG observations and procurements routed through the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation should be examined through a dedicated review, the inquiry said. Post-incident case studies should also be discussed at senior officers’ meetings and used to update standard operating procedures.

Electrical Inspectorate capability gap

The Assistant Electrical Inspector who led the joint inspection had received no technical training since joining the department in 2012 or after being promoted in 2021. He reportedly admitted that he had been unable to determine the cause of a fire in any of the eight or nine previous inspections conducted by him.

The inquiry called this a serious capability gap and warned that it might not be an isolated case. It recommended urgent technical training for Electrical Overseers and Inspectors responsible for examining electrical fires.

Why This Matters

This matters because it shows how a single fire can expose weaknesses across multiple systems — from building design and enforcement to rescue equipment and technical training. When Skylifts fail, cables block access and licences are ignored, the cost is paid in lives.

It also matters because the report does not stop at blaming individuals; it points to structural issues like 853 vacant firefighting posts, informal operator training and a lack of backup tall-reach equipment. These are not one-off errors; they are systemic gaps that can repeat in other incidents.

For Delhi residents, the message is clear: fire safety is not just about having fire tenders; it is about clear lanes, legal wires, proper ventilation and enforced building norms. In simple Hinglish, agar sadak par wire aur encroachment hain, toh rescue mushkil hoti hai.

India angle

For Indian readers, this story is directly relevant because urban fires in congested lanes are a recurring problem across cities. From Mumbai to Kolkata, narrow streets, illegal wires and mixed land use often turn small fires into major tragedies.

The India angle also includes the governance dimension. When MCD licences are violated and no one acts, or when electrical inspectors lack training, the risk multiplies. That is why the inquiry’s recommendations on enforcement, training and equipment are important beyond Delhi.

There is also the technology angle. Drone-based surveys, digital land records and modern fire equipment are increasingly part of urban safety discussions. But if overhead cables and untrained operators remain, the technology alone cannot prevent disasters.

Analysis

My opinion is that the inquiry is unusually candid in naming specific lapses — from the Licensing Inspector to the authorised dealer’s training record. That level of detail suggests an intent to drive real change, not just close the file.

I also think the staffing and training gaps are the most concerning long-term issues. A 25 per cent vacancy rate in firefighting posts and inspectors who admit they cannot determine fire causes point to deeper capability problems. Fixing those will take time, but it is essential to prevent future tragedies.

What Next

The immediate next step will be the implementation of the inquiry’s recommendations. This includes forming a technical expert committee to examine the Skylift malfunction, initiating disciplinary action against the Licensing Inspector, and pushing for mandatory recurring training for DFS operators and electrical inspectors.

The MCD and other urban local bodies are likely to face pressure to enforce mixed-land-use conditions more strictly and to remove unauthorised banners and overhead obstructions in congested lanes. BSES and cable operators may also be asked to rationalise wiring and ensure minimum clearance from electricity lines.

Longer term, the report’s call for backup tall-reach equipment, better ventilation norms and retrofitting of windows or balconies in similar buildings could shape Delhi’s fire-safety planning. If authorities act on these recommendations, the Palam inquiry could become a reference point for urban fire safety reforms across India.

Conclusion

The magisterial inquiry into the Palam fire has put the failures on record: illegal wires left hanging, licence violations left unchecked, rescue equipment without an immediate backup, hundreds of vacant firefighting posts and officials without adequate technical training. The result was a preventable tragedy that killed nine members of a family.

The report does not offer easy answers, but it does offer a roadmap: enforce building and licence norms, clear rescue lanes, train operators and inspectors properly, and ensure backup equipment at major incidents. For Delhi, and for other Indian cities facing similar risks, the question is whether these lessons will be acted upon before the next fire strikes.

Written By A. Jack