Ten fictitious names on Mumbai Police payroll received nearly Rs 6.5 crore in salaries between 2019-2020; five accused, two suspended as investigation traces bank accounts and system vulnerabilities.
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In a shocking revelation that has embarrassed the Mumbai Police Department, a payroll “scam” involving nearly Rs 6.5 crore in salaries paid to 10 non-existent employees has come to light six years after the transactions occurred. The fraud, which surfaced during the migration of employee data from the old Sevarth salary portal to a new software platform, has led to the registration of a case against five individuals, including former administrative officers and clerks, and the suspension of two senior ministerial staff.
According to a complaint filed by a police officer from the north regional division, ten non-police personnel were frequently listed as employees and received monthly salaries into their bank accounts between December 2019 to February 2020, and again from June to September 2020. The 10 fictitious names listed in the First Information Report (FIR) are: Ramdas Bhogle, Sudhakar Kadam, Sarju Yadav, Bhagwat Bhosale, Gunaji Khavkar, Mahadev Haldankar, Rajendra Sonar, Uttam Thorat, Suryakant Patil, and Pandurang Kadam.
Why and how the payroll scam happened
The fraud was possible because officials at the ministerial level—primarily clerks and administrative staff—allegedly colluded to fabricate attendance registers and records of ghost employees. They added names of outsiders to the payroll, created fake Service IDs and Defined Contribution Pension Scheme (DCPS) IDs, and sanctioned monthly salaries that were credited to bank accounts opened in the names of these fictitious “employees”.
The scam remained undetected for years because the names were embedded in routine payroll files, and the amounts, while significant in aggregate, were dispersed across multiple months and accounts. It was only during the migration from the old Sevarth portal to a new software platform that discrepancies in the data triggered internal checks, leading to the discovery of unauthorised salary transactions. This story was also covered by NDTV.
According to the police, officials at the ministerial level colluded to fabricate attendance registers and records of ghost employees. They allegedly added names of outsiders to the payroll. The charges include cheating, forgery, breach of trust and criminal conspiracy under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.
Yeh issue kaafi important hai because it shows how internal collusion and weak payroll controls can allow large-scale fraud even in a disciplined force like the police.
Who is accused and what action has been taken?
A case has been registered against five individuals who held office at the time of the incident. The employees named in the FIR include former administrative officers Ramkishan Goswami, Nagesh Talvadekar, and Vijaya Chavan, along with Head Clerk Ajay Rathod and Senior Clerk Amol Meshram.
The Mumbai Police Department has suspended Chavan and Meshram following allegations of creating fake Service IDs and Defined Contribution Pension Scheme (DCPS) IDs to process unauthorised salaries. The two are accused of adding 10 “employees” and sanctioning their monthly salaries.
The suspended employees are prohibited from undertaking private employment or trade, must submit regular declarations to claim subsistence allowance, and are barred from leaving the Brihanmumbai jurisdiction without prior official permission. These restrictions are standard disciplinary measures intended to prevent tampering with evidence or flight from the jurisdiction.
Statements and investigative steps
While no direct quotes from senior police officials have been released in the initial reports, the language of the complaint and FIR makes it clear that the department views this as a serious breach of trust. The police are investigating the identities of the 10 individuals listed as “employees” and determining who controlled the bank accounts opened in their names.
Investigators are likely to examine:
Bank account opening forms and KYC documents
IP addresses and login details used to access the Sevarth portal
Attendance registers and approval chains for salary disbursement
Any links between the accused and the real individuals whose names may have been misused
The fact that similar payroll data manipulations involving smaller amounts have also been reported in Dhule and Latur districts suggests that this may not be an isolated incident. Senior officials are now reviewing overall payroll system vulnerabilities across Maharashtra.
Background and context
Payroll fraud in government departments is not new in India. “Ghost employees” have been found in municipal bodies, schools, hospitals and even police forces across states, often due to manual record-keeping, weak audits and collusion among staff. The shift to digital portals like Sevarth was meant to reduce such fraud by centralising data and introducing checks.
However, as the Mumbai Police case shows, digital systems are only as secure as the people managing them. If clerks and officers can create fake IDs, manipulate attendance and approve salaries without independent verification, the system can be gamed.
The use of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, which replaced the Indian Penal Code, adds a contemporary legal layer to the case. Charges of cheating, forgery, breach of trust and criminal conspiracy under the BNS carry significant penalties, and the inclusion of criminal conspiracy suggests that investigators believe multiple people worked together over time.
Timeline
2019–2020: Unauthorised salary transactions occur in two phases: December 2019 to February 2020 and June to September 2020.
2020–2025: Fraud remains undetected as ghost employees remain on payroll; salaries are credited to bank accounts.
2025–2026: Mumbai Police migrates data from the Sevarth portal to new software; discrepancies surface during validation.
2026: Complaint filed by a north regional division officer; FIR registered against five accused.
Now: Two employees suspended; investigation into bank accounts and identities of 10 ghost employees underway.
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Why This Matters
This matters because it involves public money and the integrity of a key law enforcement agency. When police payroll can be manipulated to syphon off Rs 6.4 crore, it raises questions about oversight, audit mechanisms and internal accountability.
It also matters for morale within the force. Honest officers may feel demoralised knowing that colleagues or administrative staff could exploit the system for personal gain. For taxpayers, it is a reminder that even small manipulations, when repeated over months, can add up to large sums.
For governance, the case underscores the need for stronger internal controls, regular forensic audits and whistleblower protections. In simple Hinglish, jab system mein kamzori hoti hai, toh log faida uthate hain.
India angle
For Indian readers, this story is directly relevant because payroll fraud in government departments is a pan-India issue. From Uttar Pradesh to Tamil Nadu, “ghost employees” have been found in various sectors, costing crores of public funds.
The India angle also includes the legal dimension. The use of the BNS, 2023, in a high-profile fraud case sets a precedent for how new criminal laws are applied to financial crimes. Courts will now interpret provisions related to cheating, forgery and criminal conspiracy in the context of digital payroll manipulation.
There is also the administrative angle. Maharashtra’s review of payroll vulnerabilities across districts could lead to statewide reforms, such as mandatory biometric attendance, third-party audits and real-time monitoring of salary disbursements. If implemented, these measures could become a model for other states.
Analysis
My opinion is that the fraud was enabled by a combination of human collusion and system gaps. Digital portals alone cannot prevent fraud if the people entering data can bypass checks.
I also think the suspension of two clerks is necessary but insufficient. The real test will be whether higher-level officers who approved salaries or ignored red flags are also held accountable. Without that, the message is that only the executors, not the enablers, will face consequences.
What Next
The immediate next step will be the investigation into the 10 bank accounts linked to the ghost employees. Investigators will trace who opened the accounts, who operated them and where the money went. This could lead to more arrests, including of the outsiders who allegedly provided their identities or helped launder the funds.
The Mumbai Police may also order a forensic audit of the entire payroll system, not just the north regional division. This could uncover additional irregularities and lead to disciplinary action against more staff.
Longer term, Maharashtra may implement stricter payroll controls, such as mandatory biometric attendance, real-time anomaly detection and independent audits. If similar frauds are found in Dhule and Latur, the state may launch a comprehensive review of all departmental payrolls.
Conclusion
The exposure of a Rs 6.4-crore payroll scam involving 10 ghost employees in the Mumbai Police Department is a stark reminder that even disciplined forces are vulnerable to internal fraud when controls are weak and collusion exists. The suspension of two clerks and the registration of a case against five accused mark the beginning of accountability, but the real test will be in tracing the money, identifying all conspirators and fixing systemic gaps.
For Maharashtra, the case is an opportunity to overhaul payroll systems across departments and restore public trust. For India, it is another data point in the ongoing battle against government financial fraud. As the investigation unfolds, the focus must remain on prevention, not just punishment.
Written By A. Jack